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Corporate divestitures have been identified as important strategic 
actions with a positive impact on firm performance. Yet, what is still missing 
in the strategic management literature is an integrative framework that 
quantitatively synthesizes the relative impact of various antecedents to 
divestitures, and theoretically reconciles the multitude of theories underlying 
divestiture research. To fill this gap, the author conducts a meta-analysis 
(based on a sample of 35 studies) and develops four broad categories of 
determinants: corporate governance; firm strategy; performance; and 
industry environment. Evidence is found that divestitures are driven mainly 
by prior divestment experience, structural factors (firm size and firm 
diversification) and weak unit performance. In addition, the relative predictive 
validity of several theoretical perspectives on divestment decisions is 
assessed. 
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Corporate divestitures are major strategic decisions with 
important implications for firm competitiveness and profitability. 
Divestitures represent adjustments to a firm's ownership and business 
portfolio structure via a sell-off, spin-off and carve-out of a business 
unit, or sale of corporate assets (Brauer, 2006; Mulherin and Boone, 
2000). Following prior research, I use the terms ‘divestitures’, 
‘divesting’, ‘divestment’ and ‘divestment activity’ interchangeably in 
this paper. 
Existing research provides evidence that divestitures alleviate 
problems of misallocation of corporate resources (Hoskisson and 
Johnson, 1992), improve managerial ability to coordinate a leaner 
organization (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990) and increase profitability (Lee 
and Madhavan, 2010). As such, divestitures strengthen internal 
structural arrangements and improve the competitive position in the 
external environment. 
Despite the positive effects of divestitures, managers may be 
reluctant to undertake them, since they often come at a personal cost. 
First, divestitures might require the admission of prior mistakes and 
inappropriate strategies (e.g. McNamara, Moon and Bromiley, 2002). 
Second, divesting is inconsistent with the growth goals of managers 
(Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983), since it typically reduces firm size and 
managerial compensation. Finally, since divestitures lead to major 
structural changes in the firm, they generate intense political issues 
and resistance inside and outside the firm (Dial and Murphy, 1995). 
Since a decision to divest has important and beneficial strategic 
implications, but can be difficult to undertake, there are both 
theoretical and practical benefits in understanding the factors that 
facilitate or hinder divestitures. However, there are three factors that 
limit the ability to draw strong conclusions about divestiture 
antecedents from the extant literature. While prior research has 
identified a broad number of antecedents, the latter have usually been 
studied in isolation, with little focus on developing an integrative 
framework of divestiture determinants. In addition, there is empirical 
disagreement on the strength and sign of the relationship between 
certain antecedents and divestitures. Finally, while multiple theoretical 
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perspectives have been used to study divestitures, there is still a lack 
of consensus on which of them have the strongest predictive power 
regarding divestitures. 
To fill this gap, I conduct a meta-analytic review, which 
develops an integrative framework of the most common divestiture 
drivers, reconciles existing empirical inconsistencies on the 
relationships between antecedents and divestitures, and synthesizes 
the theories best suited to explain divestitures. I aim to make several 
contributions to the literature. 
First, contrary to the majority of existing divestiture research 
that studies the divestment decision in isolation, I build an integrative 
framework, arguing that divestitures are driven by factors related to 
internal inefficiencies and weak structural arrangements, and 
suboptimal conditions in the external environment. In particular, I 
build on prior theorizing (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996) to suggest 
four broad categories of divestiture antecedents: corporate 
governance; firm strategy; performance; and industry environment 
determinants. 
Second, via a meta-analysis I can obtain more robust effects, 
discuss with greater confidence the results obtained, and make 
broader generalizations on the validity of findings across various 
samples and research conditions. Also, with a meta-analysis I can 
resolve conflicting findings in existing research. For example, while 
some studies report a negative relationship between firm performance 
and divestitures (Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994; Shimizu and 
Hitt, 2005), others find a positive one (Berry, 2010; Quigley and 
Hambrick, 2012). Similarly, some studies identify a positive 
association between managerial equity and divestitures (Chatterjee, 
Harrison and Bergh, 2003), but others provide evidence for a negative 
relationship (Sanders, 2001; Shimizu, 2007). Finally, I can assess the 
relative importance of different factors affecting divestitures and the 
predictive validity of their underlying theories. 
Overall, this study allows the following questions to be 
answered: To what extent do various antecedents that can be derived 
from commonly used theories drive divestitures? Which commonly 
used theories are best suited to explain divestment decisions? 
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The paper is organized as follows. I begin by describing the overall 
framework of divestiture determinants and develop hypotheses on the 
factors affecting divestitures. Then, I describe the methodological 
approach, followed by the results. I conclude with a discussion of the 
findings, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
Theory and hypotheses 
Divestitures are major strategic decisions with critical 
implications for the firm's structure, competitive strategy and 
performance (Brauer, 2006). In other words, divestitures could be 
viewed as means to achieve optimal structural arrangements within 
the firm and strong competitive position in the external environment. 
Addressing these two objectives probably puts the firm in a better 
position to compete, achieve a competitive advantage and enhance 
profitability. If managers are to fulfill those two objectives, they need 
to focus on factors facilitating or hindering divestitures in order to 
achieve internal firm efficiency and external environmental 
adaptability. Subsequently, from a strategic management perspective, 
it is not only important to outline the antecedents of divestitures, but 
also to categorize them in a theoretical framework. Ultimately, I posit 
that divestitures are driven by factors related to: (a) internal 
inefficiencies and weak structural arrangements; and (b) suboptimal 
conditions in the external environment. Developing such a model of 
divestiture antecedents is consistent with several prior articles on 
divestitures (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996; Moschieri and Mair, 2008), 
which have followed this internal–external framework and have argued 
for four broad categories of factors influencing divestitures: corporate 
governance determinants; firm strategy determinants; performance 
determinants; and industry environment determinants. Using this 
framework not only allows me to examine the magnitude of effect 
sizes for each of these antecedent factors, but also helps outline which 
of these categories has the highest predictive validity in terms of firms’ 
engagement in divestiture activities. Furthermore, each of these 
categories of factors has been strongly related to a specific theory or 
theories, and the incorporation of the latter into the proposed 
framework could serve as a means of synthesis and assessment of the 
validity of those theories as they apply to corporate divestitures (cf. 
Sleesman et al., 2012). 
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In particular, I posit that firm factors such as strategy and 
performance determinants will have the strongest impact on 
divestitures, followed by corporate factors (corporate governance 
determinants) and industry environment determinants. These 
arguments are based on the idea that managers have greater control 
over internal firm factors, which would allow them to use divestitures 
in response to deficiencies in those internal factors. In addition, prior 
research on the role of corporate and industry factors (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997, 2002; Misangyi et al., 2006) provides evidence that 
those factors matter less in driving firm strategic behavior. 
Below I elaborate on each category of factors influencing divestitures. 
Corporate governance determinants 
Corporate governance determinants have been the most studied 
divestiture antecedents in prior research. The unifying theme among 
all governance determinants is that they influence the motivation and 
discretion of managers to undertake divestitures. Since divestitures 
generally benefit shareholders, but involve cognitive dissonance and 
managerial reluctance to implement (Dial and Murphy, 1995), the 
effectiveness of firm governance factors is likely to have an impact on 
the likelihood of divestitures (Sanders, 2001). The underlying theory 
behind the relationship between corporate governance factors and 
divestitures is agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). At the 
heart of agency theory lies the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers and the potential means through which 
these interests could converge. While shareholders strive for higher 
returns and wealth maximization, managers are self-interested and 
may engage in actions to increase personal wealth even at 
shareholders’ expense. Without proper controls over managers, their 
actions could seriously affect firm wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
For example, driven by self-serving objectives for firm growth 
(Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983), maintaining the status quo (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992), and reluctance to admit prior mistakes 
(McNamara, Moon and Bromiley, 2002), managers are reluctant to 
divest corporate divisions even if the latter are underperforming. 
However, with proper governance mechanisms in place, managers are 
more likely to engage in divestment activities. I examine the following 
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governance variables: boards of directors; large external shareholders; 
separation of CEO and board chairman positions (no duality); and 
managerial equity. 
The theoretical argument behind the first three factors follows 
agency theory logic. More specifically, the stronger those governance 
mechanisms, the more likely firms will engage in shareholder-
beneficial strategies, such as divestitures. For example, the level of 
(in)dependence of directors from executives, and especially the CEO, 
is particularly important for boards to fulfill their fiduciary duties. When 
the board is dominated by outsiders, they are more independent of the 
CEO and are more likely to challenge inefficient strategies and force 
the CEO to initiate actions which create shareholder value (cf. Kroll, 
Walters and Wright, 2008). 
Similarly, the existence of large external shareholders serves as 
an effective monitoring mechanism that increases the interest 
alignment between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). External shareholders possess sizeable shares in the firm and 
have the leverage to exercise pressure on managers (Schnatterly, 
Shaw and Jennings, 2008) to execute value-enhancing strategies 
consistent with shareholders’ interests (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). 
In addition, CEOs who also serve as the chairman of the board 
(or position of duality) will be more likely to discourage divestitures for 
two reasons. First, because CEOs with duality have considerable 
influence over board members, they could filter information to board 
members and control the agenda of board meetings and deliberations 
in the boardroom (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Thus, they are able 
to divert attention away from CEO-sensitive topics, such as potential 
divestitures of poorly performing divisions. Additionally, duality 
undermines directors’ ability and motivation to monitor the CEO. 
Owing to fear of CEO retaliation, directors are less inclined to question 
CEO decisions, even if they consider those decisions inappropriate 
(Westphal and Bednar, 2005). Considering that CEOs are interested in 
maintaining the status quo and preserving their firms intact (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992), the duality position gives them strong power 
to prevent attempts at divesting corporate divisions. 
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The final antecedent factor under this category is managerial 
equity. When managers possess firm shares, they become partial 
owners of the firm, and their income is tied to its performance. This 
creates incentives for managers to pursue strategies that are beneficial 
for shareholders and for their personal wealth (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone 
and Franco-Santos, 2010). As such, classical agency theory suggests 
that managerial equity could align the interests of managers and 
shareholders (Dalton et al., 2003) and encourage implementation of 
value-increasing activities, including divestitures. 
However, findings from other domains in management challenge 
the above arguments. More specifically, I draw on research of self-
identification and socio-emotional wealth to argue that managerial 
equity reduces the likelihood of divesting. Prior research shows that 
firm ownership leads to stronger managers’ identification with their 
organization (French and Rosenstein, 1984) which enhances their 
emotional attachment to the firm, often called socio-emotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). This emotional attachment could lead to 
decision biases where managers favor strategies inconsistent with 
economic efficiency rationales. For example, Gomez-Mejia and 
colleagues (2007) find evidence that, in order to maintain their 
attachment with the organization (socio-emotional wealth), individuals 
are willing to sacrifice economic performance. 
Translating this logic to divestitures, I argue that managerial 
ownership of the firm will reduce their willingness to dispose of firm 
assets, despite the fact that this decision is justified by performance 
improvements. Being partial owners helps managers to identify 
strongly with the firm, and this identification generates substantial 
non-economic benefits (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In this case, 
divesting corporate assets (which enhances financial outcomes) could 
be viewed as secondary in priority to maintaining the firm intact 
(which is beneficial to self-identification with and attachment to the 
firm). Additionally, ownership enhances managerial influence over 
other firm stakeholders. Managers with large ownership stakes are 
able to obscure information about underperforming units, downplay 
the seriousness of units’ financial failures and fend off internal and 
external pressures to divest those units (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-
Nickel and Guttierez, 2001). 
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Overall, I offer the following hypothesis regarding the impact of 
corporate governance determinants on divestitures:  
H1: 
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) their boards 
are outsider-dominated; (b) there are large external 
shareholders; (c) there is no CEO duality; and (d) managerial 
equity is low. 
Firm strategy determinants 
Firm strategy has a major impact on the firm's ability to 
compete and is dependent on the firm's existing structural 
characteristics and accumulated experiences and routines. These 
structural arrangements and organizational experiences facilitate or 
hinder the firm in devising and implementing important strategic 
activities. Considering that divestitures are major strategic actions with 
strong performance implications (Lee and Madhavan, 2010), I posit 
that these two elements (structural characteristics and organizational 
experiences) of a firm's strategy will be important determinants of 
corporate divestitures (Johnson, 1996). 
Under structural arrangements, I examine level of 
diversification, firm size and prior acquisitions, arguing that these 
factors contribute significantly to internal (in)efficiency. A common 
theoretical framework that could integrate the above factors is 
portfolio theory (Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Markides, 1992). Its main 
focus is on internal efficiencies and efficient management of corporate 
units within diversified corporations. In addition, the theory is 
concerned with the means and mechanisms through which managers 
could achieve appropriate and beneficial internal organizational 
structures and design. Thus, portfolio theory could view divestitures as 
means for solving suboptimal and inefficient forms of internal 
organizing. 
Level of diversification is associated with a bigger number and 
more diverse divisions within the firm. Thus, a highly diversified firm is 
less dependent on a single division, and it becomes easier to divest the 
latter, especially when it experiences poor performance. Additionally, 
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beyond a certain level of diversification, firms begin to experience 
problems stemming from loss of control and misallocation of corporate 
resources (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), inefficiencies (Hoskisson 
and Turk, 1990) and increased bureaucratic costs (Nayyar, 1992). 
Ultimately, as diversification increases, the organizational structure 
becomes more difficult to manage and more complex, which inhibits 
information-processing capabilities and translates into loss of 
corporate value (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Similarly, firm size is associated with additional inefficiencies in 
managing the firm. Increasing firm boundaries inhibits executives’ 
ability to manage its operations and procedures effectively. Larger size 
translates into higher levels of complexity, which undermine corporate 
control. Size also generates rigidity and tunnel vision (Miller and Chen, 
1994), which inhibit the firm's awareness and quick response to 
market rivals. This jeopardizes the firm's ability to compete and 
ultimately leads to loss of competitive advantages. To counteract those 
tendencies, managers may downsize by divesting assets (e.g. Decker 
and Mellewigt, 2012). 
Acquisitions are a common growth strategy that leads to 
increased levels of diversification and size, raising the complexity of 
the firm and thus placing more coordination and control burdens on 
managers (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Also, acquiring other 
companies requires additional efforts for the successful incorporation 
of those companies within the existing portfolio of businesses in the 
focal firm. This, however, diverts managerial attention away from the 
core organizational activities and generates costs associated with the 
integration of the newly added businesses into the existing lines of the 
firm's activities (e.g. Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). In general, to 
reduce inefficiencies, bureaucracy and complexity stemming from 
more diversification, larger size and numerous acquisitions, managers 
may engage in divestitures. 
Organizational experiences are an important determinant of 
future firm behavior, because those experiences are incorporated into 
existing routines and practices and facilitate managerial decision-
making (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006). Through prior 
divestitures, managers generate useful experiences and lessons that 
guide them in their future engagement in divestitures. The theory that 
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underlies research on organization experiences is organizational 
learning theory (Levitt and March, 1988). It argues that firm strategic 
behavior is driven by organizational routines that are established 
through prior managerial experiences (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The 
more experienced managers become with a particular strategic action, 
the more confidence they gain, and the more likely they are to repeat 
that action (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006). 
When managers have engaged in divestitures, they become 
familiar with the process of divesting, which becomes institutionalized 
and enters the organization's set of routines (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The existence of routines generates a consistent pattern of 
conducting activities and creates pressure for managers to follow these 
patterns. Combined with the fact that divestitures generally 
accumulate firm wealth (Lee and Madhavan, 2010), this suggests that 
prior divestitures encourage managers to undertake additional 
divestitures in the future. Overall, the cumulative effects of divestiture 
experience and expected divestiture success may bolster managers’ 
confidence in implementing subsequent divestitures, despite their 
inherent complexity. In support of this argument, prior research finds 
that experience with different types of major reorganizational changes 
in the firm is positively related to future such changes (Haleblian, Kim 
and Rajagopalan, 2006).  
H2: 
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) the firm is 
more diversified; (b) the firm is larger; (c) the firm has 
previously undertaken a larger number of acquisitions; and (d) 
the firm has previously completed a larger number of 
divestitures. 
Performance determinants 
One of the most commonly studied antecedents to divestitures 
has been prior performance at both the corporate and the unit level. 
Prior research argues that poor performance indicates organizational 
efficiency problems, and divestitures are used to reduce such problems 
(Johnson, 1996; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). A theoretical 
framework that integrates the performance determinants of 
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divestitures is the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert and 
March, 1963). The BTOF argues that managerial behavior is influenced 
by performance feedback obtained by comparing performance 
aspiration levels against current performance (Greve, 2003). When 
performance is strong and firms possess solid financial resources, they 
are less likely to deviate from their current routines and practices, thus 
enforcing managerial persistence and preservation of the status quo 
(Greve, 2003). However, when performance is below those 
aspirations, firms engage in a search for solutions to return to initially 
aspired levels of performance. Hence, prior poor performance leads to 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and forces managers to engage in 
change, such as divestitures. Furthermore, poor corporate 
performance is usually accompanied with weak balance sheets and 
inability to invest in new projects and innovate. In order to generate 
the funds necessary to pay debts or invest in new strategies, firms 
may decide to divest unprofitable corporate assets. As such, 
divestitures may serve as a tool to strengthen the financial position of 
the firm and achieve corporate efficiency. Additionally, strong 
corporate performance is an indication that current strategies are 
effective, and there is no need to make changes in corporate scope 
(Iyer and Miller, 2008). 
Prior unit performance is also a strong driver of divestitures. 
When a corporate unit is underperforming, it sends a negative signal 
to corporate executives about its ability to achieve operational 
efficiency and gain competitive advantage. Thus, this unit is perceived 
as a burden to the entire organization by draining valuable corporate 
resources, and therefore should be divested (e.g. Brauer, 2008; 
Shimizu, 2007). Furthermore, since corporate units are evaluated on 
future prospects and on meeting internal financial criteria (e.g. 
Thomas and Waring, 1999), poor unit financial results reflect the 
inability of the unit to meet performance aspirations, which 
encourages its divestment. 
Another factor closely related to prior performance is corporate 
resources or slack. When a firm is performing well and generates 
strong cash flows, it can build and set aside additional resources. To 
the contrary, a firm in financial distress is less likely to possess slack 
resources. In general, the availability of slack resources serves as a 
buffer and reduces the firm's sensitivity to performance misfortunes 
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and willingness to engage in major changes (Palmer and Wiseman, 
1999). This large pool of slack resources leads managers to maintain 
the status quo and not change existing organizational structures and 
firm boundaries. However, when corporate resources are depleted, 
‘managers may increase efforts at raising resource levels through 
various risk-laden actions’ (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999, p. 1043), 
including major strategic moves, such as divestitures.  
H3: 
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) prior 
corporate performance is low; (b) prior unit performance is low; 
and (c) slack is low. 
Industry environment determinants 
Industry characteristics affect the level of fit between the firm 
and its external environment and influence the amount of 
organizational change necessary to adapt to the environmental 
context. As a result, environmental factors have a direct bearing on 
managerial alertness to external conditions, assessment of the firm's 
fit with the environment, and the need for strategic changes 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). The theoretical perspective that 
examines how industry conditions affect firm conduct and strategy is 
industrial organizational economics (IO economics) (Bain, 1968; 
Porter, 1980). In the context of divestitures, IO economics would 
suggest that the strategic decision to divest is driven by the industry 
structure in which the firm operates. More specifically, unfavorable 
conditions, such as increasing environmental uncertainty and 
decreasing or low environmental munificence, are likely to drive more 
divestitures. 
Environmental uncertainty is associated with a high degree of 
unpredictability in the environment, which presents many unclear 
situations to organizational decision-makers (Duncan, 1972). Highly 
uncertain environments are characterized by instability and consistent 
changes that place ‘tremendous cognitive demands’ (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1993 p. 488) on decision-makers and limit their ability to 
conduct appropriate evaluation of the external conditions and their fit 
with the firm. Thus, in highly uncertain settings, managers have great 
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difficulty developing their plans (conduct) in the market. This 
uncertainty is unsettling and reduces managers’ ability to govern the 
firm efficiently (Bergh and Lawless, 1998) and, ultimately, raises the 
costs of hierarchical governance. A common approach to reducing 
those costs is for managers to focus internally and simplify 
organization structures (e.g. Palmer and Wiseman, 1999) by divesting 
corporate units (Keats and Hitt, 1988). 
Environmental munificence is characterized by the availability of 
resources and the ability of the environment to support growth (Dess 
and Beard, 1984). Thus, highly munificent environments serve as a 
buffer from external hostilities (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993), reduce 
managers’ alertness, and lead them to maintain the status quo in their 
firms. Alternatively, munificent markets provide more opportunities for 
managers to improve the performance of relatively weak divisions, and 
thus reduce the likelihood of divestiture of those divisions. In contrast, 
low environmental munificence leads to scarcity of resources and 
increased threats faced by managers. Simply stated, low-munificence 
industries do not provide a buffer against environmental hostilities 
(Parks and Conlon, 1995), have higher rates of rivalry and lower profit 
potential, and may encourage managers to engage in cost-cutting and 
restructuring activities, including divestitures. Stated formally:  
H4: 
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) 
environmental uncertainty is high; and (b) environmental 
munificence is low. 
Methods 
Sample 
To identify the population of papers that tested the relationships 
between various antecedents and divestitures, searches for relevant 
articles were conducted in several databases, such as ABI/INFORM 
COMPLETE, ISI Web of Science, JSTOR, Business Source Premier and 
Academy of Management Proceedings. I focused only on published 
studies,1 as recent theorizing finds strong evidence that the omission 
of unpublished work or the file drawer problem ‘does not produce an 
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inflation bias and does not pose a serious threat to the validity of 
meta-analytically derived conclusions’ (Dalton et al., 2012 p. 221). 
Furthermore, I relied only on peer-reviewed journals and left out 
books and book chapters. As a result, I identified 192 articles 
addressing divestitures and, after careful review, 35 studies were 
included (see Appendix Studies used in the meta-analysis), 158 
relevant samples and total N = 188,078 for the antecedents–
divestitures association. I did not specify a starting year of publications 
for the search, but the earliest articles coded dated back to 1986, and 
the latest ones were published in 2015. While I identified a large 
sample of studies based on the keyword searches, the number of 
studies that I could use for this inquiry was reduced for several 
reasons. Most importantly, the majority of divestiture research 
examined the performance implications of divestitures, rather than the 
antecedents of divestitures, rendering those studies unusable for the 
study. Additionally, a number of the articles were either theoretical in 
nature or lacked necessary data, such as sample size or correlation 
coefficients, to be meta-analyzed. I would like to acknowledge that, 
while the total sample of 35 articles is smaller than a recent meta-
analysis on the performance implications of divestiture (Lee and 
Madhavan (2010) used 94 studies), it is comparable to other meta-
analyses (e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Deutsch, 2005). 
Inclusion criteria 
While I strived to be broad and comprehensive by expanding 
beyond the management literature and including research in the 
accounting and finance fields, I had to remain focused and exclude 
academic fields that might have fundamentally different approaches to 
the divestiture construct (e.g. research treating employee lay-offs as 
divestment activities). As a result, I decided to follow prior meta-
analytic research in the strategic management field with regard to the 
selection of journals (e.g. Dalton et al., 1998, 1999; King et al., 
2004): see Table 1. 
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Table 1. List of journals used to identify divestiture studies 
Journal name Impact factora 
 
Academy of Management Journal 4.974 
Accounting Review 2.234 
Administrative Science Quarterly 2.394 
Applied Financial Economics 0.64b 
British Journal of Management 1.909 
Financial Management 0.873 
Journal of Accounting Research 2.449 
Journal of Business NA 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 1.261 
Journal of Finance 6.033 
Journal of Financial Economics 3.759 
Journal of Financial Research NA 
Journal of Management 6.862 
Journal of Management Studies 3.277 
Managerial and Decision Economics 1.07c 
Organization Science 3.807 
Strategic Management Journal 2.993 
Strategic Organization 1.853 
aThe impact factor is for 2013. 
bAverage impact factor for 2011. 
cAverage impact factor over three-year period. 
The key search words were derived in accordance with the 
various definitions of divestitures presented in prior review articles 
(Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996). The computer-aided search was based 
on the following keywords: divest, divestiture, divestment, spin-off, 
carve-out, split-up, sell-off, dediversification, refocusing, downscoping, 
disbanding, abandonment, and firm exit. In addition, I examined the 
reference lists of the potentially applicable articles for additional 
studies that might not have been identified through the database 
search. To be included in the lists, those studies had to include a 
correlation between the variables of interest or statistical data 
sufficient to calculate correlations. In addition, I included correlation 
coefficients only from studies in which I could conclude a causal 
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relationship between the antecedent variables and divestitures. That 
is, I included correlation coefficients only when the antecedent 
variables temporarily preceded the divestiture event (e.g. antecedent 
variables were measured at time t−1 and divestitures occurred at time 
t). Finally, I needed at least three studies to estimate the relationship 
between a particular antecedent and divestitures. 
Coding 
The initial step in the coding process included several meetings 
between the author and three additional coders, where we outlined 
coding rules and jointly coded seven articles. After the coders had 
become familiar with the coding procedures, the remaining articles 
were split among the author and the three coders for independent 
coding. I randomly selected several articles that were coded by 
everyone, and any discrepancies were resolved through additional 
discussions. 
A list of the dependent and all independent variables and their 
definitions is provided in Table 2. 
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Existence of divestiture(s) (coded as 1 if there was a divestiture and 
0 otherwise); number of units or divisions divested; number of 
divestitures and divestment intensity (ratio of divested assets to 









Number of blockholders, blockholder equity and institutional equity 
combined together. Blockholders represent the number of 
shareholders with at least 5% stake in the company. Blockholder 
equity is the percentage corporate shares owned by shareholders 
with at least 5% stake in the company. Institutional equity is the 
amount of corporate shares owned by institutional investors, such 
as pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, divided by the 




Amount of stock owned by the CEO and insider directorsb (Dalton 
et al., 2003). 
Duality A dummy variable coded as 1 if the CEO and board chairman 




Number of acquisitions conducted by the firm in prior periods. 
Prior 
divestitures 
Number of divestitures conducted by the firm in prior periods. 
Firm slack 
resources 
Slack resources have been operationalized as absorbed slack 
(selling, general and administrative expenses over sales), 
unabsorbed slack (current assets to current liabilities), potential 
slack (inverse ratio of debt to equity), and free cash flow ((operating 
income – taxes – interest expense – depreciation – preferred 
dividend – common dividend)/equity) (Bourgeois, 1981; Haleblian 
et al., 2012). 
Prior corporate 
performance 
Relied on multiple operationalizations used in prior research, such as 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales 
(ROS), and Tobin's Q (Greve, 2003). 
Prior unit 
performance 
Return on assets at the unit level (ROA) (e.g. Greve, 2003). 
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Entropy index (ΣPi ln(1/Pi), where Pi is the sales attributed to 
segment i, and ln(1/Pi), the logarithm of the inverse of sales, is the 
weight for each segment i. (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). 
Firm size Logarithm of firm assets or sales (Iyer and Miller, 2008). 
Dynamism Standard errors of regression coefficient, obtained from regressing 
total industry sales over year-counter variable, divided by mean 
industry sales (Dess and Beard, 1984). 
Munificence Regression coefficient, obtained from regressing total industry sales 
over year-counter variable, divided by mean industry sales (Dess 
and Beard, 1984). 
aUsing each of these three elements separately did not change the significance of 
the results. 
bWhen inside directors’ stock ownership and CEO stock ownership were used 
separately, similar results were obtained, with the only exception that CEO stock 
ownership was significant for 90% confidence interval. 
Meta-analytic procedures 
Meta-analysis is a technique that allows the true relationship 
between two variables to be estimated across separate samples. This 
estimate (or effect size) is a mean correlation coefficient derived from 
the correlation coefficients of all samples by weighting the sample size 
of each study. The observed zero-order coefficient provides a more 
accurate estimation of the population mean because various statistical 
artifacts are corrected and positive and negative sampling errors are 
eliminated (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). In this meta-analysis, I 
estimated effect sizes through the correlation coefficient r, which is 
used primarily in meta-analyses and has the advantages of easy 
interpretation and small downward bias (Aguinis et al., 2011; 
Geyskens et al., 2009). A main part of any meta-analysis is the 
calculation of the standard errors, which allows for the examination of 
correlation variability and the creation of confidence intervals 
(Whitener, 1990). If the confidence interval for a given correlation 
coefficient does not include zero, it could be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant association between the variables under 
investigation. To conduct the statistical analysis, I relied on Hunter and 
Schmidt's (1990, 2004) psychometric analytic procedure to derive the 
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mean correlation scores. This method relies on a random-effects 
model, which is the preferred approach because it assumes that 
population effect sizes vary across samples and provides appropriate 
type I error rate (Geyskens et al., 2009; Kepes et al., 2012). In 
addition to correcting for sampling errors, Hunter and Schmidt (1990) 
advise addressing several artifacts, such as measurement error, 
dichotomization of a truly continuous variable and range restriction. 
Since the variables in the meta-analysis are objective and no reliability 
statistics are given, I followed prior research and used a reliability 
level of 0.8 (Dalton et al., 1999).2 Range restrictions were set at 1 
(Lee and Madhavan, 2010). No study in the meta-analysis included a 
dichotomization of a truly continuous variable. Finally, I inspected the 
data for outliers through schematic plots and did not identify outliers 
to be a problem in the study. 
Robustness check 
There have been concerns about non-independence in meta-
analyses and the impact of pooling multiple correlation coefficients 
from a single study (Lee and Madhavan, 2010). I handled this issue in 
the following manner. First, if a study reported multiple measures of 
the dependent and/or independent variables and thus multiple 
correlations, I averaged those correlations. As a robustness check, I 
also conducted analyses based on only one correlation coefficient and 
on all correlation coefficients from a single study (Geyskens et al., 
2009). The results remained the same. In addition, I checked whether 
different operationalizations of the antecedent variables produced 
similar results. Overall, findings were consistent with those reported 
here. 
Finally, as an additional robustness analysis, I addressed 
potential publication bias (the file drawer effect). Such bias is present 
when the probability of a study being published is dependent on the 
magnitude, direction or significance of the study's results (Begg, 
1994). I employed Duval and Tweedie's (2000) ‘trim and fill’ method. 
Findings indicate that publication bias is not a serious issue for the 
meta-analysis. 
In summary, the robustness of the results is consistent with 
prior evidence suggesting that methodological approach and ‘judgment 
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calls involved in the conduct of a meta-analysis have little impact on 
the resulting … effect sizes’ (Aguinis et al., 2011 p. 5). 
Results 
Table 3 presents a summary of the results for the hypothesized 
relationships. Hypothesis 1 relates to the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on divestitures. Overall, I find weak support 
for it. In line with my theorizing, results show that outsider-dominated 
boards are positively associated with divestitures (ρ = 0.07, k = 9, N 
= 3747), and greater managerial equity leads to fewer divestitures (ρ 
= −0.11, k = 6, N = 2311). Large external shareholders and CEO 
duality do not have a statistically significant effect on divestitures. In 
Hypothesis 2, I theorized on the impact of firm strategy determinants 
on divestitures. Overall, this hypothesis was supported, since level of 
diversification (ρ = 0.09, k = 19, N = 27,162), firm size (ρ = 0.33, k = 
27, N = 53,008) and prior divestitures (ρ = 0.53, k = 6, N = 13,783) 
lead to increased subsequent divestment activity. I did not find 
statistically significant correlation between prior acquisitions and 
subsequent divestitures. Hypothesis 3 discussed the role of 
performance determinants on divestitures. I found that prior unit 
performance (ρ = −0.18, k = 4, N = 1750) and slack resources (ρ = 
−0.04, k = 24, N = 24,771) exhibit a negative association with 
divestitures, which supports my theorizing. However, prior corporate 
performance did not affect divestitures in a statistically significant way. 
Finally, I find no support for Hypothesis 4, since results show no 
statistically significant association between environmental 
uncertainty/munificence and divestitures. 
Table 3. Meta-analytic results of the various antecedents to corporate divestituresa 
Variable Supported N k R Ρ SD 95% CI 90% CV 
 
Corporate governance (H1) 
Outsider-
dominated board 
Yes 3747 9 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.07 
Large external 
shareholders 
No 6602 14 0.02 0.03 0.08 −0.02 0.08 −0.08 0.13 
Managerial equity Yes 2311 6 −0.08 −0.11 0.03 −0.15 −0.06 −0.14 −0.07 
Duality No 1252 3 −0.03 −0.04 0.00 −0.09 0.02 −0.04 −0.04 
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Table 3. Meta-analytic results of the various antecedents to corporate divestituresa 
Variable Supported N k R Ρ SD 95% CI 90% CV 
Firm strategy (H2) 
Level of 
diversification 
Yes 27,162 19 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.14 −0.04 0.22 
Firm size Yes 53,008 27 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.20 0.46 −0.10 0.77 
Prior acquisitions No 7126 8 0.026 0.032 0.17 −0.09 0.15 −0.19 0.25 




No 29,633 24 0.02 0.02 0.10 −0.02 0.06 −0.11 0.15 
Prior unit 
performance 
Yes 1750 4 −0.14 −0.18 0.08 −0.27 −0.08 −0.28 −0.07 
Firm slack 
resources 
Yes 24,771 24 −0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.12 0.04 
Industry environment (H4) 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
No 3634 7 0.01 0.01 0.14 −0.10 0.13 −0.17 0.20 
Environmental 
Munificence 
No 13,299 7 −0.003 −0.003 0.00 −0.02 0.01 −0.003 −0.003 
aN = combined sample size; k = number of correlations; r = raw score 
correlation; ρ = corrected true score population correlation; SD = standard 
deviation of true score population correlation; CI = confidence interval; CV = 
credibility interval. 
In addition to the hypothesized relationships, I also conducted 
some exploratory analyses of moderating conditions.3 In particular, I 
was able to identify two moderating conditions (as with the main 
analyses, I needed at least three studies to perform moderation 
analyses). The first moderating condition is period of divestitures 
(before and after 1990). Prior research argues that, during the 1980s, 
there were significant changes in the market for corporate control 
(Gibbs, 1993) and a strong push for refocusing (Chatterjee, Harrison 
and Bergh, 2003). The second moderating condition is whether the 
study was based on single-industry or multiple-industry data. The 
results are presented in Appendix Moderation analyses of the 
relationship between antecedents and corporate divestitures. The 
majority of the confidence intervals overlap, which prevents us from 
stating any statistically significant difference in results. I found 
statistically significant results for level of diversification before and 
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after 1990, firm size before and after 1990, and prior corporate 
performance before and after 1990. Those results suggest that, before 
1990, managers were more sensitive to and responded more strongly 
to performance shortfalls and inefficient internal arrangements by 
divesting. In addition, firm size had a significantly stronger association 
with corporate divestitures when data came from a single industry 
compared with multiple industries. 
Discussion 
In this meta-analysis I developed an integrative framework for 
organizing divestiture antecedents, identifying the strongest predictors 
of divestitures, and outlining the underlying theories behind the 
decision to divest. Drawing on the idea that divestitures help firms 
improve internal organizational inefficiencies and adapt successfully to 
suboptimal external environment conditions, I argued that it is 
necessary to focus on and examine factors facilitating or hindering 
divestitures in order to achieve those two objectives. As a result, I 
build a framework where divestitures are driven by internal factors 
(corporate governance determinants, firm strategy determinants and 
performance determinants) and external factors (industry environment 
determinants). In addition, the meta-analysis allowed me to answer 
the two research questions: ‘To what extent do various antecedents 
that can be derived from commonly used theories drive divestitures?’ 
and ‘Which commonly used theories are best suited to explain 
divestment decisions?’ The results indicate that divestitures are largely 
driven by factors residing within the firm and the corporate unit rather 
than the external environment. In addition, inefficient structural 
arrangements, weak unit performance and low availability of slack, 
and prior experience with divestitures appear as the main drivers of 
subsequent divestitures. Finally, organizational learning theory, 
portfolio theory and the BTOF, rather than agency theory, seem to be 
better suited to explain divestiture decisions. 
Theoretical implications 
A somewhat surprising finding, given the broad reliance on 
agency theory in prior research, is the fact that the theory received 
very weak support in the study (only one out of four relationships 
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followed agency theory logic). While independent boards might benefit 
shareholder value via encouraging divestitures, managerial ownership 
exacerbates the problem, and large external shareholders and lack of 
duality do not help. This raises the question: What do these results 
mean for future research on corporate governance and agency theory? 
I argue that scholars need to go beyond the predominant economic 
focus of agency theory, where firm value is seen through the lens of 
economic returns. Rather, I propose that agency theory examines 
different types of value measured by socio-emotional wealth, firm 
identification and preservation of firm boundaries. For example, it is an 
interesting avenue for future research to compare family firms and 
public firms. I expect that, among the former, socio-emotional wealth 
and maintaining the firm intact will have much greater priority 
compared with public firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As a result, 
family firms may be less likely to divest, even if corporate units 
underperform. Furthermore, I expect to see differences in the 
applicability of agency theory across different institutional regimes. In 
particular, countries such as the USA and UK focus more on the 
protection of shareholders’ interests, while countries such as Germany 
and Japan emphasize the interests of employees (e.g. La Porta et al., 
2000). This may indicate that divestitures are less likely to happen in 
the latter institutional regimes, since divestitures would negatively 
affect existing employees and morale of the firm. 
The results show that large external shareholders do not affect 
the likelihood of divesting. While this may seem surprising, it could be 
attributed to the way large external shareholders have been 
operationalized in prior research. While the majority of divestiture 
research has employed the classical agency theory view of 
homogeneity among large external shareholders, more recent research 
shows that different types of large external shareholders, such as 
dedicated or transient, exhibit different associations with firm strategic 
actions (Connelly et al., 2010). In particular, dedicated external 
shareholders exhibit long-term orientation, and transient shareholders 
are more short-term oriented. This suggests that the former might be 
more tolerant and patient with underperforming firms (Koh, 2007) 
before encouraging the divestiture of weak corporate units. On the 
contrary, the latter shareholders are more interested in quick gains 
(Porter, 1992), which makes them less tolerant towards 
underperforming units. 
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Firm strategy determinants were the strongest drivers of 
divestitures. I am not surprised that structural factors, such as firm 
size and level of diversification, which relate to internal organizational 
efficiency, take priority in managerial focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997) 
and play a dominant role in the decision to divest. In addition, these 
results point at the relative efficacy and applicability of portfolio theory 
to divestitures and its strong predictive power. 
The single strongest predictor of divestitures is prior 
divestitures. This finding suggests that managers are able to obtain 
valuable lessons from prior divestitures, encode this knowledge in 
organizational routines, and successfully use it in future similar 
strategic actions. Thus, being involved in prior divestitures enhances 
the confidence and skills of managers to continue with future 
divestitures. As result, I find strong support for organizational learning 
theory as an underlying theory in research on divestitures. Still, those 
findings do not elaborate on the potential contingencies in the 
relationship between prior divestiture experience and future 
divestment. One such contingency is the elapsed time between 
divestitures. Prior research on strategic decision-making, including 
acquisitions, finds evidence that the best way for managers to learn 
from prior activities is by spacing those activities not too close or too 
far apart from each other (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2013; Hayward, 
2002). Translating this logic to divestiture suggests that, if the interval 
between divestitures is too long, it could reduce the likelihood of 
subsequent divestitures, because managers might forget some of the 
routines and practices associated with prior divestitures. Another 
important contingency that deserves attention in future research is the 
type of divestiture experience that managers have accumulated. I 
argue that, if managers had conducted successful divestitures in the 
past, they would be more confident and willing to engage in future 
divestitures. 
The results show that prior acquisitions do not appear to predict 
subsequent divestitures. We envision several explanations for these 
results. First, acquisitions are large strategic events that are closely 
followed by financial experts, and their subsequent divestiture would 
indicate that those acquisitions were inappropriate. No manager is 
willing to admit such mistakes (e.g. McNamara, Moon and Bromiley, 
2002). Second, acquisitions are rather different from divestitures, 
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which might prevent the transfer of experience and practices from the 
former to the latter. While acquisitions require the appropriate 
integration of new units, assets and employees to existing 
organizational routines, divestitures necessitate the appropriate 
disposal of current organizational assets. Third, the data allowed me to 
code only the number of prior acquisitions, without distinguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful acquisitions. It is a fruitful 
avenue for future research to study whether number of acquisitions 
interacts with acquisition performance to jointly predict corporate 
divestitures. 
Overall, I find relative support that BTOF and performance 
determinants explain divestiture decisions well. In particular, poor unit 
performance leads to its divestiture, suggesting that managers 
carefully monitor and review corporate units and make appropriate 
decisions to divest weak units and keep well-performing ones. 
Interestingly, poor corporate performance exhibited no impact on 
divestitures. It may be that, while poor corporate performance might 
reflect the general financial position of the firm, it is harder for 
managers to identify precisely the source of corporate losses (Hayward 
and Shimizu, 2006) and thus blame a particular division. 
Finally, industry conditions appear to have no impact on 
divestitures. Such a finding is not very surprising, given prior evidence 
that many firms are not responsive to industry prospects when making 
strategic decisions (Arrfelt et al., 2015). A potential explanation for 
this result is the fact that environmental factors may be less salient 
cues to managers regarding divestitures (e.g. Ocasio, 1997). In other 
words, managers may be more attentive to and respond more strongly 
to internal firm factors that dominate their focus of attention. In a 
similar vein, managers may have greater control over internal firm 
factors compared with environmental conditions, which would allow 
them to use divestitures in response to deficiencies in those internal 
factors. 
The overall results of my integrative framework confirmed the 
expectations of which categories of antecedents will be the strongest 
drivers of corporate divestitures. Firm strategy determinants, such as 
firm size, firm diversification and prior divestitures, and performance 
determinants, mainly prior unit performance, have the biggest impact 
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on the decision to divest. These are followed by corporate governance 
determinants, such as managerial equity and outsider-dominated 
boards. Those findings indicate that portfolio theory, organizational 
learning theory and, to a certain extent, BTOF are the major theories 
underlying corporate divestitures. 
While it is critical to assess the magnitude of individual effect 
sizes between antecedents and divestitures and determine which are 
the strongest predictors, it is also important to evaluate the results 
from a comparative lens. In particular, I benchmarked the magnitude 
of obtained effect sizes to other meta-analyses examining strategic 
decision-making and/or the constructs that I used (Dalton et al., 2003; 
Deutsch, 2005; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 2006; Sleesman 
et al., 2012). Overall, the correlations between my antecedent factors 
and corporate divestitures are similar and even larger in magnitude 
compared with the correlations examined in those prior meta-
analyses. This indicates that those results have theoretical and 
practical significance, and the theories outlined could serve as a 
starting point to promote further theorizing (e.g. Bosco et al., 2012). 
Practical implications 
The findings from this meta-analysis also offer some useful 
insight for managers and shareholders. In terms of corporate 
governance antecedents, stacking the boards with independent 
directors seems to produce results that are in line with shareholder 
interests and wealth maximization. However, the common argument of 
managerial ownership exacerbates the problem of executive self-
serving behavior, and I advise reconsideration of managerial pay 
design especially in terms of divestiture outcomes. Moreover, 
conducting multiple prior divestitures could be seen as valuable 
managerial experience, which helps in future corporate restructuring 
and value enhancement – when firms undertake divestitures, they 
have to put in charge of this process people with the relevant prior 
experience. However, when managers transfer experiences between 
different restructuring modes, such as transferring acquisition 
experience to divestitures, beneficial financial outcomes are not 
guaranteed. 
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Limitations and future research opportunities 
I have to point out some limitations of the meta-analysis. First, 
I was constrained to the availability of prior empirical studies and had 
to discard multiple studies that were qualitative in nature or lacked 
sufficient quantitative statistics to estimate effect sizes. Also, I am 
dependent on the quality and methodological rigor of the studies used 
in the meta-analysis. For example, I see certain limitations with the 
way large external shareholders have been measured in prior 
research. The aggregation of large external shareholders into a 
homogeneous category precludes identifying the inherent differences 
between various types of those shareholders and their different 
orientation and approach to divestitures. Such a limitation opens an 
avenue for future research to examine potential moderating 
conditions. For example, type of shareholders, various institutional 
regimes, types of firms (family vs public firms) and success of prior 
acquisitions appear to be important moderating factors that deserve 
future examination. 
Second, while the meta-analysis included only studies where the 
various antecedents were measured before the divestiture event, it is 
still not possible to infer complete causality. Future research could 
address this issue by carefully controlling for third variables and 
relying more exclusively on cross-lagged panel designs and 
appropriate estimation techniques. 
I posit that future studies could use additional theories to 
explain divestitures. One such theoretical perspective is transaction 
cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985). Considering that TCE 
theorizes on boundaries of the firm, it would be interesting to examine 
the direct impact of TCE and factors such as asset specificity and risk 
preferences on managerial choices to undertake divestitures. 
Relatedly, I posit that the resource-based view perspective (Barney, 
1991) has been underused in divestiture research. In particular, 
viewing corporate units through the lens of valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable resources could explain why certain units are 
not divested despite weak profitability. Finally, upper echelon theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) fits well with divestitures. Since 
corporate decisions and strategic actions are a reflection of managerial 
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characteristics, it would be a fruitful avenue to study how managerial 
demographic characteristics, managerial dispositional traits and 
various types of diversity, including gender diversity, among top 
executives, affect decisions to divest. For example, because diversity 
among top executives generates conflict and reduces the ability to 
reach consensus (Harrison et al., 2002; Pelled, 1996), I expect that 
divestitures are less likely to happen in firms with greater diversity 
among top executives. 
In summary, this meta-analysis aimed to develop an integrative 
framework to organize divestiture antecedents, examine which of 
those antecedents have the strongest impact on the decision to divest, 
and assess which underlying theories have the highest predictive 
power in terms of divestitures. I hope that my study provides valuable 
insights and suggestions for future research on divestitures and will 
spur the additional interest and attention that this phenomenon 
deserves. 
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Appendix: Moderation analyses of the relationship between 
antecedents and corporate divestitures 
Variable Supported N k r ρ SD 95% CI 90% CV 
 
Corporate governance (H1) 
Large external 
shareholders 
No 6602 14 0.02 0.03 0.08 −0.02 0.08 −0.08 0.13 
After 1990   2302 4 −0.02 −0.03 0.06 −0.10 0.04 0.10 0.05 
Before 1990   2542 6 0.03 0.04 0.11 −0.05 0.14 −0.10 0.18 
Firm strategy (H2) 
Level of 
diversification 
Yes 27,162 19 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.14 −0.04 0.22 
After 1990   6684 7 0.06 0.07 0.12 −0.02 0.16 −0.09 0.23 
Before 1990   1759 7 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.19 0.44 0.12 0.51 
Multi industry   23,450 15 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.13 −0.05 0.21 
Single industry   3712 4 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.20 
Firm size Yes 53,008 27 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.20 0.46 −0.10 0.77 
After 1990   22,570 12 0.29 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.52 0.02 0.69 
Before 1990   9674 5 0.66 0.82 0.28 0.58 1.1 0.46 1.2 
Multi industry   39,276 20 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.11 0.33 −0.10 0.53 
Single industry   13,732 7 0.54 0.67 0.34 0.42 0.92 0.23 1.1 
Prior 
acquisitions 
No 7126 8 0.026 0.033 0.17 −0.09 0.15 −0.19 0.25 
Multi industry   1249 5 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 




No 29,633 24 0.02 0.02 0.10 −0.02 0.06 −0.11 0.15 
After 1990   22,837 11 0.03 0.04 0.10 −0.02 0.10 −0.08 0.16 
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Variable Supported N k r ρ SD 95% CI 90% CV 
Before 1990   1453 4 −0.14 −0.18 0.05 −0.24 −0.11 −0.24 −0.12 
Multi industry   24,267 18 0.01 0.01 0.11 −0.04 0.07 −0.13 0.15 
Single industry   5366 6 0.04 0.04 0.05 −0.002 0.09 −0.02 0.10 
Firm slack 
resources 
Yes 24,771 24 −0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.12 0.04 
After 1990   17,859 9 −0.03 −0.04 0.05 −0.07 −0.01 −0.10 0.02 
Before 1990   1759 7 −0.01 −0.02 0.14 −0.13 0.10 −0.20 0.16 
Multi industry   20,155 18 −0.03 −0.04 0.05 −0.07 −0.05 −0.10 0.02 
Single industry   4616 6 −0.04 −0.06 0.10 −0.14 0.03 −0.19 0.08 
aN = combined sample size; k = number of correlations; r = raw score correlation; ρ 
= corrected true score population correlation; SD = standard deviation of true score 
population correlation; CI = confidence interval; CV = credibility interval. 
1Unpublished studies are excluded, since they have not been vetted in 
the review process. As a result, there is a higher level of uncertainty 
about the quality in terms of methodological rigor and reliability of 
empirical findings with unpublished studies compared with published 
studies. 
2Additional analyses were conducted using 0.7 and 1.0 reliability 
estimates, and there were no significant differences in results. Thus, 
only results with 0.8 reliability levels are reported. Supplementary 
results are available from the author on request. 
3The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion. 
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